This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric competitions with unconditional and conditional investments. Such competitions include lobbying settings, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races, among others.
employed in competition, the type of asymmetries among competitors, the degree to which expenditures are sunk, and the number of prizes.
Consider lobbying settings in which firms expend resources in order to influence a policy maker. If expenditures take the form of monetary outlays and all firms have the same cost of capital, then it is reasonable to think of firms' marginal cost of influence as linear. But if a firm has a reputational advantage and high costs of capital, its "lobbying technology" may be more reasonably thought of as having convex costs (relatively low marginal costs up to a moderate level of influence, due to the reputational advantage, and relatively high marginal costs at higher levels of influence, due to high costs of capital). Similarly, the lobbying technology of a firm that is relatively unknown and has low costs of capital may be characterized by concave costs. Lobbying restrictions, geographic location, or preferential treatment by the policy maker further impact firms' lobbying technologies, inducing additional non-linearities and asymmetries among firms. In some lobbying settings, firms also commit to expenditures conditional on a favorable outcome. For example, a firm may commit to building factories and creating new jobs if it is granted one of a limited number of manufacturing licenses. Thus, the specification of firms' lobbying technologies, the type of asymmetries among firms, the combination of unconditional and conditional investments, and the number of eventual "winners" may change according to the lobbying setting studied.
The same is true for other competitions with an all-pay feature. In a competition for promotions, workers often differ in their abilities, experience, and social skills. More than one prize may be awarded, in the form of a promotion to the next level in the hierarchy.
In an R&D race, firms may differ in their research technologies, past R&D investments, and access to human capital. If firms compete by building prototypes, then all firms incur the cost of their prototypes, but the cost of developing the product is borne only by winning firms. In a political campaign, candidates typically differ in their constituencies, political savvy, and wealth. Only those elected have to make good on their promises, but all candidates expend resources during the campaign.
Clearly, the strategic interaction among competitors is influenced by these dimensions in which competitions differ, as are policy-relevant variables. In the context of lobbying, the amount of resources expended by competing firms and the efficiency of the outcome are affected by firms' cost of capital, legal restrictions, and other policy measures that impact firms' lobbying technologies. In a competition for promotions, the amount of effort employees exert depends on employees' characteristics, how they are evaluated, and the number and value of promotions. In an R&D race, the quality of competitors' products depends on the scoring rule used, whether subsidies are provided, and what part of the R&D investment is required before the winners are determined. As these examples demonstrate, understanding the relationship between the characteristics of a competition and its outcome is useful for making policy decisions and for contest design.
To investigate this relationship, I analyze equilibrium behavior in a contest model that accommodates a wide range of technologies, general asymmetries, a combination of unconditional and conditional investments, and one or more identical prizes. The analysis makes it possible to calculate players' effort and output, the degree of rent dissipation, and the level of efficiency of the outcome. It also makes it possible to compare these variables across different specifications of contests. This provides a framework in which competitions can be studied and various policy and design issues can be addressed.
In a contest, each player chooses a "score," and the players with the highest scores obtain one prize each. In a lobbying setting, for example, a player's score represents the influence he achieves over the policy maker. Conditional on winning or losing, a player's payoff decreases continuously with his chosen score. This formulation allows for a high degree of heterogeneity among players. In addition, the difference in a player's payoff between winning and losing may depend on his chosen score. This accommodates a combination of unconditional and conditional investments. 1 The primitives of the model are commonly known, capturing players' knowledge of the asymmetries among them. This helps interpret players' payoffs as "economic rents," in contrast to "information rents" that arise in models of competition with private information. 2 Contests are defined in Section 1.
1 It also accommodates player-specific risk attitudes, and player-and score-dependent valuations for a prize. 2 Examples of such models include those studied by Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela (2001, 2006) , Todd Kaplan et al. (2002) , and Sergio Parreiras and Anna Rubinchik (2009). These models are related to the Section 2 presents a constructive characterization of the unique equilibrium for a large class of single-prize and multiprize contests. When there are two players and one prize, players' equilibrium strategies are given by a simple closed-from formula. 3 For the more complicated case of m > 1 prizes, I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium when there are m + 1 players. The main component of the algorithm is a dynamic "supply function" of the hazard rates of players' strategies as a function of score.
The construction relies on knowledge of players' equilibrium payoffs, which is provided by the payoff result of Ron Siegel (2009). 4 A property of the equilibrium is that players may choose scores from multiple intervals. This happens when players have relative cost advantages at different scores. The participation result of Siegel (2009) provides a sufficient condition for the algorithm to construct the unique equilibrium when there are more than m + 1 players.
Section 3 applies these results to investigate the effects of conditional investments when competitors differ in their costs of employing a common underlying production technology.
In this class of simple contests, each player is characterized by his cost coefficient and valuation for a prize. Every player pays a positive fraction α ≤ 1 of the cost associated with his chosen score. This cost is the product of the player's cost coefficient and a common cost function that represents the common production technology. The remaining fraction 1 − α of the cost is paid only by the winners of the m ≥ 1 prizes. For example, in R&D races in which firms compete by building prototypes, the contest designer often specifies the extensive literature on auctions, both in assuming incomplete information and in how prizes are allocated.
The contest model presented here uses an auction-like allocation rule, but postulates complete information.
Consequently, the analysis necessitates different techniques than those used in the auction literature, and also leads to qualitatively different results. Other models of competition postulate a probabilistic relation between competitors' efforts and prize allocation. See Gordon Tullock (1980) 4 Siegel's (2009) model is more general in that he allows for players' payoffs to weakly decrease in score, but he does not solve for equilibrium.
degree of functionality that a prototype must demonstrate relative to the actual product.
Each firm then chooses the quality of the product it will produce if it wins, and pays its cost of building the corresponding prototype. This cost is a fraction α of the total cost of developing the product. Only the winning firms pay the additional fraction 1 − α of the total cost to complete the development the product. The higher the degree of functionality required by the contest designer, the higher the fraction α of the development cost that firms incur as unconditional investments.
I show that simple contests have a unique equilibrium, in which every player chooses a score from an interval. Moreover, after normalizing each player's efficiency by dividing his cost coefficient by his valuation for a prize, I show that the equilibrium strategies of more efficient players first-order stochastically dominate those of less efficient players, and that more efficient players win prizes more often than less efficient players. As α approaches 0, the most efficient players obtain a prize with near certainty. When players differ only in their valuations for a prize, as α approaches 0 the allocation of prizes becomes efficient and expenditures are maximized.
The limit of the equilibria as α approaches 0 is an equilibrium of the corresponding "discriminatory-price auction," in which all investments are conditional on winning. 5 A special case is the complete-information first-price auction. When α equals 1, all investments are unconditional. If, in addition, the common production technology is linear, we have a complete-information all-pay auction (henceforth: all-pay auction). 6 The all-pay auction, along with its variants, has been used extensively to model rent-seeking and lobby- 5 In this equilibrium, no player chooses weakly dominated strategies with positive probability, and the equilibrium is robust to the tie-breaking rule. This provides a selection criterion among the continuum of equilibria of the discriminatory-price auction, which are not payoff equivalent. 6 The equilibrium uniqueness result applied to all-pay auctions corrects that of Derek J. Clark and
Christian Riis (1998). They constructed an equilibrium of the multiprize all-pay auction and claimed it was unique. Their proof of uniqueness relied on showing that in any equilibrium no positive bid is chosen with positive probability by any player and the best response set of each player is an interval. Their proof of these claims was incorrect.
competitions for a monopoly position (Tore Ellingsen (1991)), waiting in line (Clark and Riis (1998)), sales (Hal Varian (1980) ), R&D races (Partha Dasgupta (1986)), competitions for multiple prizes (Clark and Riis (1998) and Yasar Barut and Kovenock (1998)), the effect of lobbying caps Gale (1998, 2006) and Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) ), and R&D races with endogenous prizes (Che and Gale (2003) ). Simple contests generalize all-pay auctions by allowing for non-linear costs and accommodating both unconditional and conditional investments.
The Appendix contains proofs of results from Section 2. An Online Appendix contains an example, the specification of the contest depicted in Figure 2 , and proofs of results from Section 3.
The Model
In a contest, n players compete for m homogeneous prizes, 0 < m < n. The set of players {1, . . . , n} is denoted by N . Players compete by each choosing a score from R + = [0, ∞), simultaneously and independently. Each of the m players with the highest scores wins one prize. In case of a relevant tie, any procedure may be used to allocate the tie-related prizes among the tied players.
Given scores s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), where s i is player i's chosen score, player i's payoff is
where v i : R + → R is player i's valuation for winning, c i : R + → R is player i's cost of losing, and
is player i's probability of winning, which satisfies
1 if s j < s i for n − m or more players j 6 = i;
any value in [0, 1] otherwise, such that P n j=1 P j (s) = m. Note that a player's probability of winning depends on all players' scores, but his valuation for winning and cost of losing depend only on his chosen score. The primitives of the contest are commonly known. A player's score represents his overall performance, which may depend more than one factor. For example, in a lobbying setting a firm's score may be a function of the amount of money the firm invests, its reputation, and its political connections. In a competition for promotions, a worker's score may be a function of the number of hours worked, tenure, and social skills. In an R&D race in which a firm's score is the quality of the prototype it produces, this quality may be a function of various performance measures. The score represents an optimal choice of the different factors as one number according to which players are evaluated. Differences among players are captured by their different valuations for winning and costs of losing.
I consider contests that meet the following Assumptions B1-B3.
Assumption B1 v i and −c i are continuous and strictly decreasing.
Assumption B2 says that prizes are valuable, and that sufficiently high scores are prohibitively costly. Assumption B1 captures the all-pay component of contests. It is not satisfied by complete-information first-price auctions, for example, since a player pays nothing if he loses, so c i ≡ 0. But assumption B1 is satisfied when an all-pay element is introduced, e.g., when every bidder pays some positive fraction of his bid whether he wins or not, and only the winner pays the balance of his bid. Assumptions B1 and B2 are depicted in Figure 1 . As Figure 1 shows, the payoff difference between winning and losing may depend on the player's chosen score. This accommodates a combination of unconditional and conditional investments, as shown in Section 3. A non-constant payoff difference can also be used to model different risk attitudes and score-dependent valuations for a prize.
In a separable contest, this payoff difference is constant, so v i (s i ) = V i − c i (s i ) and and Riis (1998)). 7 Assumption B3, which completes the description of contests, uses the following definition.
Definition 1 (i) Player i's reach r i is the score at which his valuation for winning is 0.
That is, r i = v −1 i (0). Re-index players in (any) decreasing order of their reach, so that r 1 ≥ r 2 ≥ . . . ≥ r n .
(ii) Player m + 1 is the marginal player.
(iii) The threshold T of the contest is the reach of the marginal player: T = r m+1 .
Assumption B3 states that the reach of the marginal player is different from that of the other players.
Assumption B3 Only the marginal player's reach is equal to the threshold, so r i 6 = T for every player i 6 = m + 1.
In a separable contest, a player's reach is the score whose cost is the player's valuation 7 In an all-pay auction, v i (s i ) = V i − s i , c i (s i ) = s i , and ties are resolved by randomizing uniformly, where V i is bidder i's valuation for a prize.
for a prize. For example, in an all-pay auction a player's reach is his valuation for a prize, so Assumption B3 is met if the marginal player's valuation for a prize is different from those of the other players. The model of contests described here is a special case of Siegel's (2009) all-pay contest model. The main difference is that he allows for weakly decreasing v i and −c i . 8 
Existing Results
This subsection lists four results, Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2, which I use in solving for equilibrium. They are immediate corollaries of results in Siegel (2009). 9 The first result characterizes players' equilibrium payoffs (without solving for equilibrium), and uses the following definition.
Definition 2 Players i's power w i is his valuation for winning at the threshold. That is,
In particular, the marginal player's power is 0.
Assumptions B1 and B3 imply that only the marginal player has power 0. In an all-pay auction, for example, a player's power is equal to his valuation for a prize less that of the marginal player. 
then player i does not participate in any equilibrium. In particular, if these conditions hold for all players m + 2, . . . , n, then in any equilibrium only the m + 1 players 1, . . . , m + 1 may participate.
The third result states that an equilibrium always exists.
Lemma 1 Every contest has a Nash equilibrium.
The fourth result enumerates four properties of any equilibrium.
Lemma 2
In any equilibrium of a contest, (1) no score in (0, T ) is chosen with positive probability by any player, (2) every score in (0, T ) is a best response for at least two players, (3) no score above the threshold is a best response for any player, and (4) players 1, . . . , m+ 1 participate.
Solving for Equilibrium
A player's (mixed) strategy is a probability distribution over [0, ∞), and an equilibrium is a profile of strategies, one for each player, such that each player's strategy assigns probability 1 to the player's set of best-responses given the other players' strategies. I describe a strategy of player i by a cumulative distribution function (CDF) G i , which for every x ≥ 0 specifies the probability G i (x) that player i chooses a score lower or equal to
Consider first the relatively simple case of two players and one prize. Part (2) of Lemma 2 shows that the players must behave in a way that makes every positive score up to the threshold a best response for both of them. 10 That both players have interval best-response sets pins down the unique equilibrium even without knowing players' payoffs.
Theorem 3 In a two-player, single-prize contest the unique equilibrium is given by
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that G is an equilibrium. For uniqueness, choose an equilibrium of the contest. By part (2) of Lemma 2, both players are indifferent among all scores in (0, T ). Moreover, no player chooses T with positive probability, otherwise the other player would not have best responses slightly below T , contradicting part (2) of Lemma 2. Therefore, the equilibrium has the form µ Section 3.1 below provides an application of this result to certain non-separable contests. 12 Applied to separable contests, Theorem 3 extends the results of Kaplan and 10 For equilibrium construction it is more convenient to work with best responses than with supports. 11 When there are more than two players, since players 1 and 2 participate in any equilibrium (part (4) of Lemma 2), a single-prize contest has at most one equilibrium in which only two players participate.
Example 3 in Siegel (2009) shows that a single-prize contest may have multiple equilibria when more than two players participate.
12 Theorem 3 and its proof also hold for contests that do not satisfy Assumption B3, i.e., contests in which both players' powers are 0, because parts (2) and (3) of Lemma 2 do not rely on Assumption B3.
Wettstein (2006) and Che and Gale (2006) , who considered two-player separable contests with ordered cost functions.
I now turn to multiprize contests. Because more than two players participate in any equilibrium (part (4) of Lemma 2), different players may compete on different sets of scores.
This makes solving for equilibrium considerably more difficult than in the two-player case.
I restrict attention to regular contests, which are contests that meet the following regularity condition.
Condition R The valuations for winning and costs of losing of players 1, . . . , m + 1 are piecewise analytic on [0, T ].
13
Consider the three-player, two-prize, separable regular contest depicted in Figure 2 .
14 The contest may be used to model a lobbying setting in which three firms attempt to influence a policy maker through costly "favors," whose cost is incurred regardless of the outcome. The two firms that offer the best favors obtain a manufacturing license whose value is normalized to 1. Each firm's score is the quality of favors it offers. The firms differ in their technologies for producing favors, which leads to differences in their cost functions. costs for high scores. The contest may also be used to model a setting in which three firms compete in a market that can profitably support only two products, so the firm with the lowest-quality product is excluded from the market. Each firm's score is the quality of its product, and firms' cost functions are derived from their production technologies. 14 Players' cost functions are given in the Online Appendix. and x 4 are "switching points," above which the set of active players (denoted in curly brackets) changes. As Figure 3 shows, different players compete on different sets of scores and, moreover, players 2 and 3 have non-interval best-response sets. This happens because players 2 and 3 have relative cost advantages at different scores. Non-interval best-response sets are new in the complete-information contest literature. 15 The equilibrium depicted in Figure 3 is constructed using the algorithm described in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 shows that the equilibrium is unique and explains to what extent the construction applies to n-player contests. Section 2.3 discusses how the equilibrium construction results can help us think about real-world competitions. Figure 2: Players' costs, reaches, and powers 15 In the equilibria of Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993), who considered a single-prize all-pay auction that violates Assumption B3, a player's best-response set may be the union of 0 and a single interval whose lower endpoint is strictly positive. All such equilibria disappear when players' valuations are perturbed slightly to produce unique players with the first-and second-highest valuations (so that Assumption B3 holds). This leaves a single equilibrium, in which the best-response set of each player is an interval. A similar perturbation produces a single equilibrium, in which the best-response set of each player is an interval, in González-Díaz (2009). In contrast, the non-interval property that arises here is "fundamental" in nature: it is robust to perturbations in the contest's specification, and, moreover, a player's best-response set may consist of several disjoint intervals of positive length. 
The Algorithm
The algorithm constructs an equilibrium G of an (m + 1)-player regular contest for m prizes. The construction proceeds from 0 to T in several steps. The first step determines G (0). The second step determines, for any switching point x < T that has been reached, the set A + (x) of all the players that will be active immediately above x. This step is divided into two parts. Part one uses G (x) to identify a set of candidate players CP (x), which is a superset of A + (x). Part two uses CP (x) to define a supply function S x with a unique fixed point H (x), and uses H (x) to determine the set A + (x) from CP (x). The third step uses A + (x) to extend G from x up to the next switching pointx. The fourth step identifiesx. Steps two to four are then repeated until T is reached. I show that T is reached in a finite number of steps and that the resulting G is indeed an equilibrium.
Step 1: To determine G (0), recall that by Theorem 1 players 1, . . . , m have positive equilibrium payoffs (because they have positive powers). Therefore, none of these players has an atom at 0 (chooses 0 with positive probability), because by choosing 0 a player loses for sure, so his payoff is 0. 16 By part (2) of Lemma 2, every score immediately above 0 is a best response for at least two players. For this to hold, player m + 1 must have an atom at 0, and the size of the atom must be such that at least one other player obtains his equilibrium payoff if he chooses scores immediately above 0. The atom cannot be larger, otherwise some player will be able to obtain more than his equilibrium payoff by choosing scores immediately above 0. These observations prove the following lemma, which does not rely on Condition R.
Lemma 3
In any equilibrium of an (m + 1)-player contest, the marginal player is the only player who has an atom at 0, and the size of the marginal's player's atom is min j≤m w j /v j (0).
In accordance with Lemma 3, set G i (0) = 0 for i < m+1 and G m+1 (0) = min j≤m w j /v j (0).
Step 2 part one: Suppose G has been defined up to a switching point x < T (the first switching point is 0). We would like to identify a set of players, the "candidate players at
x," who may be active immediately above x when G is extended above x. Consider a player i who chooses scores immediately above x when other players choose scores according to G. Because CDFs are right-continuous and the player loses only when his score is lower than those of all other players, 1 − Π j6 =i (1 − G j (x)) + ε is the probability that the player wins a prize, for some small ε ≥ 0. As player i chooses scores closer to x, ε approaches 0.
then player i cannot be active immediately above x, because he does not obtain his equilibrium payoff there. The candidate players at x are the other players, and for each such player i we have
We therefore denote the set of candidate players at x by CP (x) = {players i for which (2) holds} .
0.
The set CP (x) contains at least two players. 18 If CP (x) contains only two players, part (2) of Lemma 2 shows that they must both be active immediately above x. The difficulty is to determine which players are active immediately above x when CP (x) contains more than two players.
Step 2 part two: Denote the set of players active immediately above x by A + (x) ⊆ CP (x). To identify A + (x) we use the following three observations. First, a player in A + (x) obtains his equilibrium payoff when choosing scores immediately above x. For such a player the increase in the "cost" associated with choosing a higher score is exactly offset by the increase in the probability of winning. Second, players who are not in A + (x) do not choose scores immediately above x, so their CDFs do not change. Third, no player should obtain more than his equilibrium payoff by choosing scores immediately above x.
To express these observations formally, let
and rewrite (2) as
Taking logs and differentiating (3), and recalling that the CDFs of players not in
do not change, we obtain that
where
) denotes player j's hazard rate at x, and all derivatives are right-derivatives. 19 For expositional simplicity, suppose that ε i (x) > 0 for every 18 This is shown in the proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix. 19 By Condition R, q i is right-continuously differentiable. For x < T , q 0 i (x) is non-positive, because
. 20 Because no player should obtain more than his equilibrium payoff immediately above x, we have (4) and (5) can be combined to give
By adding up (6) for players i in CP (x) (and recalling that the hazard rates at x of players not in A + (x) are 0), we have that
This means that H (x) is a fixed point of the function
The function S x can be thought of as an aggregate supply function. To see this, think of the right-hand side of (6) with H instead of H (x) as player i's "supply curve" of "hazard rate" as a function of "price" H. Then S x (H) is the aggregate supply of hazard rates at
x given H. To determine H (x) from S x , note that S x is a piecewise linear function, whose slope increases by 1 every time H exceeds the semi-elasticity of a player in CP (x). Since all semi-elasticities are positive and CP (x) includes at least two players, S x is a convex function that starts below the diagonal and reaches a slope of at least 2. Therefore, it intersects the diagonal precisely once above 0, at H (x) (see Figure 4 below). Note that the definition of S x does not involve A + (x). Therefore, H (x) can be deduced from CP (x)
as the fixed point of S x , there are at least two such players (recall that CP (x)
contains at least two players). If ε l (x) > H (x) for a player l in CP (x), then the player cannot obtain his equilibrium payoff immediately above x and is therefore not in
This is depicted in Figure 4 : CP (x) = {i, j, l} and A
, and ε l (x) > H (x). Also, S 0 x does not increase at ε k (x), since player k is not a candidate player at x (k is not in CP (x)). max {H − ε i (y) , 0}
for scores y immediately above x. 21 The lowest-order right-derivatives at x of ε i (·) and H (x, ·) that differ determine whether the player is in A + (x) (< means the player is in 22 H (x, y) can also be computed as follows. Order the players in CP (x) in any increasing order of semi-
Step 3: Use G (x) and A + (x) in the following way to extend G from x tox, wherex is the first switching point above x (the first score above which the set of active players changes). For a player j not in A + (x), set G j (y) = G j (x) for every score y in (x,x] \ {T },
and a score y in (x,x), rewrite (3) with y instead of x as
by taking natural logs. 23 The system of |A + (x)| linear equations (where |S| denotes the cardinality of a set S) in |A
, given by (7) for every player i in A + (x) has a unique solution. 24 In this solution, for every player i in
Therefore, for every player i in A + (x) and every score y in (x,x) set G i (y) according to (8) ; ifx < T, set G i (x) according to (8) . Set G i (T ) = 1 for every player i, because by elasticity immediately above x (this can be done by analyticity). Let L (x) be the highest l ≥ 2 (in this
for all scores y immediately above x (that L (x) is well defined follows from analyticity as well). Then
This follows from the uniqueness of the positive fixed point of S x,y . H (x, ·) defined in this way immediately above x is analytic, and therefore has right-derivatives of any order at x. This definition of H (x, ·) also applies when a unique positive fixed point of S x,x = S x does not exist. 23 The proof of Lemma 5 in the Appendix shows that D > 0, and q i (y) > 0 because y < T . 24 To see this, write the system of equations in matrix form, and note that the matrix 1 |A + (x)|×|A + (x)| − I |A + (x)|×|A + (x)| , where 1 M×M and I M×M are a matrix of ones and the identity matrix of dimensions M × M , is invertible:
part (3) of Lemma 2 no player has best responses above the threshold.
Step 4: The switching pointx is the first score above x for which A + (x) 6 = A + (x).
This can happen for one of two reasons. The first reason is that a new player becomes active abovex, so A + (x) includes a player not in
is a player i who obtains his equilibrium payoff atx ((3) holds withx instead of x). The second reason is that an active player becomes inactive abovex, so a player in A + (x) is not in A + (x). This means that the player's hazard rate atx is 0. Therefore, to identifȳ
or h j (y) = 0 for a player j in A + (x), or y is a concatenation point of the cost function of a player in A + (x) (recall that costs are piecewise-defined functions), or y = T . 25, 26 If y 6 = T , determine CP (y) from G (y) and A + (y) from CP (y) as described in Step 2 above.
If A + (y) 6 = A + (x), then y is the switching pointx. If A + (y) = A + (x), then y is not a true switching point, and the search continues above y for the next candidate switching point. This can only repeat a finite number of times beforex is identified.
27
The following lemma shows that the algorithm reaches the threshold via a finite number of switching points. Its proof and those of Theorems 4, 6, and 5 below are in the Appendix.
Lemma 4
The algorithm does not stop before reaching the threshold, and the number of switching points in [0, T ] identified by the algorithm is finite.
Theorem 4 summarizes the construction.
Theorem 4 For any (m + 1)-player regular contest, the algorithm constructs an equilibrium G. The equilibrium is characterized by a partition into a finite number of intervals 25 Ignore any player i for whom ε i (x) = H (x) and all order derivatives of ε i (·) and H (x, ·) at x are equal. Such a player's hazard rate will not drop below 0, because, by analyticity, his semi-elasticity will equal the aggregate hazard rate. 26 That y is strictly greater than x follows from the definition of A + (x). Indeed, when G is extended above x according to Step 3, the hazard rate at scores y immediately above x of every player i is max {H (x, y) − ε i (y) , 0}. Therefore, immediately above x the hazard rates of players in A + (x) are non-negative, and for the other players (1) holds. 27 This follows from analyticity, as in Lemma 7 in the Appendix.
of positive length, on the interior of which the set of active players remains constant.
In accordance with parts (1) and (3) of Lemma 2, G is continuous on (0, T ) and 28 Let
The reach of the marginal player is 1, and that of all other players is 2. Players are ordered in decreasing order of reach, and the threshold is 1. The power of players 1, . . . , m is 1, and that of the marginal player is 0. Theorem 1 shows that in any equilibrium players' powers equal their payoffs. Applying the algorithm, we have that G m+1 (0) = 
28 That G cannot have more than m − 1 atoms at the threshold is shown in the proof of Theorem 4.
29 Because the contest is separable,
, so for i < m, ε i (0) = 3, and ε m (0) = ε m+1 (0) = 1. Therefore, H (0) = 2 and only players m and m + 1 are active immediately above 0.
If the number k i is the same for every player i, then in the equilibrium G constructed by the algorithm every player is active immediately below the threshold and no player has an atom at the threshold.
Theorem 5 applies to all-pay auctions, because in an all-pay auction v 0 i ≡ −1 for every player i. In addition, players' semi-elasticities are equal, so once a player becomes active, he remains active up to the threshold. This explains why in a multiprize all-pay auction (Clark and Riis (1998)) each player chooses bids from an interval that ends at the threshold, and no player has an atom at the threshold. Section 3 studies a class of contests that generalize all-pay auctions and have these properties. first identifying players' equilibrium payoffs. This is possible because each player's best-response set is an
Equilibrium Uniqueness and n-player Contests
The algorithm constructs an equilibrium G with the property that every player's bestresponse set is a finite union of disjoint intervals. The logic underlying the algorithm can be used to show that G is the only equilibrium with this property. To prove that the equilibrium is unique, however, we must rule out the existence of all other equilibria, including those that do not have this property. 33 This is done by the following theorem. Proof. Immediate from Theorem 6 and part (4) of Lemma 2.
In some regular contests, players m + 2, . . . , n do not participate in any equilibrium. A sufficient condition for this is given by Theorem 2. For such contests, a stronger result can be stated.
Theorem 8 A regular contest in which players m + 2, . . . , n do not participate in any equilibrium has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, players m + 2, . . . , n choose 0 and players 1, . . . , m + 1 behave as in the unique equilibrium of the reduced contest with interval and players' marginal costs are identical. Such a procedure does not work here, since the set of players active immediately below x cannot be uniquely determined from G (x) and players' payoffs using local conditions.
Equilibria for which this property does not hold may exist if the contest is not regular. The Online
Appendix depicts an equilibrium of a contest that is not regular in which a player's best-response set is the Cantor set. players 1, . . . , m + 1. A sufficient condition for this is that the conditions of Theorem 2 hold for every player m + 2, . . . , n.
Proof. By Theorem 6, the only candidate equilibrium is the one described in the statement of the theorem. This is an equilibrium of the contest, because by Lemma 1 every contest has an equilibrium.
Note that the conditions of Theorem 2 do not place any restrictions on how the valuations for winning and costs of losing relate among players N \ {m + 1}. Thus, Theorem 8 applies to a wide class of contests.
Discussion
Theorems 3 and 8 and the equilibrium construction algorithm provide strong predictions when there are m+1 players or the valuations for winning and costs of losing of players m+ 2, . . . , n are ranked relative to those of the marginal player. These predictions, along with the flexibility of the contest framework, can improve our understanding of competitions with an all-pay feature, and help us think about policy and design questions. Consider, for example, a researcher studying a lobbying setting in which several firms make outlays to influence a policy maker. Suppose the researcher has data on the value of a favorable outcome to each firm and on the determinants of firms' lobbying technologies, such as their costs of capital, reputation, and political connections. If the researcher also has some idea of how each firm's investment translates into influence over the policy maker, then he can formulate firms' valuations for winning and costs of losing to obtain a contest, as in Figure   2 . He can then use the equilibrium results to predict firms' payoffs, the probability that each firm obtains a favorable outcome, and firms' outlays, which may be unobservable.
Policy measures, such as imposing lobbying caps, restricting the type of lobbying activities in which firms can engage, or otherwise changing firms' lobbying technologies, translate directly to changes in firms' valuations for winning and costs of losing. Equilibrium analysis of the resulting contest can help predict the effects of such policy measures and whether they are desirable according to certain criteria, such as efficiency and equality. The effects of restricting or enlarging the set of lobbying firms (by limiting or encouraging entry) can be similarly predicted.
The framework can also guide a contest designer in using the set of instruments available to him. Consider, for example, an R&D race intended to foster innovation. Depending on the context, the designer may have different goals in mind: maximizing the quality of the best innovation, the quality of the two best innovations, or perhaps the average quality of contestants' innovations. The designer may have the flexibility to determine the value and number of prizes, the scoring rule used, which may treat different contestants differently, and the degree of functionality of the innovation that must be demonstrated before the winner or winners are selected. Each specification of these factors, together with contestants' innovation technologies, can be translated to a contest. The tools developed above can then be used to predict the value of the outcome variables in which the designer is interested. By optimizing over the set of feasible contests, the designer can get a sense of how to best use the instruments at his disposal to achieve his goals.
One may also be interested in studying competitions that are not fully specified. An example is a competition in which all contestants employ technologies with quadratic costs, whose coefficients may not be known or have not yet been determined. Because the corresponding contests are not fully specified, the equilibrium construction results, even though they apply in principal, may not deliver formulae describing players' strategies when there are multiple prizes. Nevertheless, our understanding of how the equilibrium is constructed and, in particular, how the supply function relates the set of active players in each region to players' semi-elasticities, may be used to derive certain qualitative features of the outcome. When the class of contests is parameterized by one or more variables, we may be able to conclude how these qualitative features change with the parameters.
Section 3 conducts such an exercise to study how the size of the all-pay component affects the outcome of a competition.
Simple Contests
This section studies a class of contests that allows for a combination of unconditional and conditional investments, while accommodating a limited degree of asymmetry among The reach r i of player i satisfies v i (r i ) = 0, so
Since c is strictly increasing and players are ordered in decreasing order of reach,
The contest's threshold is T = r m+1 = c 
and the payoff of every other player is 0. We therefore have the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1
In a simple contest, the payoff of every player i < m+1
The payoffs of players m + 1, . . . , n are 0. Payoffs are independent of α and c.
Corollary 1 shows that the payoff of every player i < m + 1 increases in his valuation for a prize and in the marginal player's cost coefficient, and decreases in the player's cost coefficient and in the marginal player's valuation for a prize. In particular, the payoff of player i is not affected by the characteristics of any player other than players i and m + 1.
Aggregate expenditures equal the allocation value of the prizes less players' utilities.
We therefore have another corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 In a simple contest in which
and are independent of α and c.
Corollary 2 shows that when players' valuations for a prize are equal, as is the case when prizes are monetary, aggregate expenditures increase in valuations and in the cost coefficients of players 1, . . . , m, and decrease in the marginal player's cost coefficient.
Simple Contests with a Single Prize
Lemma 1 and Theorems 2 and 3 show that a simple contest with a single prize has a unique equilibrium, which is described in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 A simple contest with a single prize has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, players 3, . . . , n choose 0 and the CDFs of players 1 and 2 are
The corollary shows that the unique equilibrium is not independent of α and c (although equilibrium payoffs are independent of α and c). It is straightforward to verify that for any α and c player 1's CDF first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) that of player 2.
Therefore, player 1 wins the prize with a higher probability than player 2 (see Corollary 5 below). Moreover, ∂G shown that player 1's probability of winning increases (and that of player 2 decreases) as α decreases.
In the limit, as α approaches 0, player 1 chooses the threshold and wins the prize with certainty, and player 2 chooses scores lower or equal to x ≤ T with probability
This is an equilibrium of the limit game in which every player i's payoff when choosing x is 0 if he loses and V i − γ i c (x) if he wins (see Section 3.2.1 below). A special case is the complete-information first-price auction.
Simple Contests with Multiple Prizes
For the remainder of the section assume that c is piecewise analytic. The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 8, since players m + 2, . . . , n do not participate in any equilibrium (the conditions of Theorem 2 hold).
Corollary 4 A simple contest with multiple prizes has a unique equilibrium. In the unique equilibrium, the strategies of players 1, . . . , m + 1 are given by the algorithm, and players m + 2, . . . , n choose 0.
Let a i = γ i /V i , and note that a i is increasing in i. The following result shows that in the unique equilibrium, the best response set of every player i ≤ m+1 is a single interval whose upper bound is T and whose lower bound increases in the player's reach (or, equivalently, decreases in a i ).
Theorem 9
In the unique equilibrium of a simple contest, every player i ≤ m +1 is active on the interval £ s The proof of Theorem 9 and those of Corollary 5, Theorem 10, and Corollary 6 below are in the Online Appendix. The outline of the proof is as follows. First, the higher a player's reach, the higher the score at which he becomes active for the first time. Second, semi-elasticities at every score increase in players' reaches, so when a player becomes active his semi-elasticity is higher than those of the other active players. Thus, no active players become inactive as a result of a new player becoming active. 36 Third, the semi-elasticity 35 The score 0 is not a best response for players i < m + 1. Figure 3 at the switching point x 1 : player 1 becomes active, and because his semi-elasticity is sufficiently lower than that of player 2, player 2 becomes inactive immediately
Contrast this with what happens in
of an active player never increases above the aggregate hazard rate. 37 This shows that once a player becomes active he stays active until the threshold. Fourth, the conditions of Theorem 5 hold, so every player 1, . . . , m + 1 becomes active below the threshold and no player has an atom at the threshold. Figure 6 depicts players' atoms and the regions in which players are active in the unique equilibrium. A corollary of Theorem 9 and the fact that players' semi-elasticities are increasing in reach is that players' equilibrium CDFs can be ranked in terms of FOSD.
Corollary 5 For every positive α ≤ 1 and every i < j ≤ m + 1, the CDF of player i FOSD that of player j. This implies that player i chooses higher scores than player j, on average, and also that player i wins a prize with higher probability than player j.
38
Using Theorem 9, I now derive an expression for the equilibrium strategies of players 1, . . . , m + 1. Recall that for any score y < T the formula for the CDF of an active player i at y is given by (8) . Since every player is active on an interval whose upper bound is the threshold, D equals 1 in (8) and the switching points are the scores s l i at which players become active. Because players with higher reaches become active at higher scores, for every y < T there is a unique j = 1, . . . , m such that y is in £ s Figure 3 at the switching point x 3 : player 3's semi-elasticity equals and then exceeds the aggregate hazard rate, so the player's hazard rate drops to 0 at x 3 and he becomes inactive immediately above x 3 .
38 In contrast to the two-player case, a player's CDF for low values of α does not always FOSD his CDF for higher values of α.
the set of players active immediately above s l j is {j, . . . , m + 1}. Thus, for a player i < j we have G i (y) = 0, and for a player i ≥ j, by substituting the expression for q i into (8) and simplifying, we have
We still have to identify the scores s l i at which players become active. For simplicity assume that the a i s are distinct. 39 Recall that s m = s m+1 = 0. The score s l i at which player i < m becomes active is the lowest score x at which he obtains his power, so that (2) holds with s l i instead of x. Substituting (9) (with active players i + 1, . . . , m + 1) into (2), it can be shown that s l i is the lowest score x that satisfies In particular, the corollary shows that when players differ only in their valuations for a prize, so that players 1, . . . , m are those with the highest valuations for a prize, allocative efficiency of the prizes can be approached arbitrarily closely by reducing the unconditional investment component α. The limiting equilibrium corresponding to α = 0 is efficient (see Section 3.2.1 below). Since players' payoffs remain the same for all α > 0 (Corollary 1), this immediately implies that as α approaches 0 expenditures approach their maximal value,
This equation characterizes s
.
Although players' individual expenditures and probabilities of winning, as well as aggregate expenditures, change with α, a simple change-of-variable argument can be used to show that they are independent of c.
Fully Conditional Investments (α = 0)
The game with α = 0 is not a contest, since Assumption B3 is violated. Instead, it is a complete-information, discriminatory-price multiprize auction in which player i's cost of bidding x is γ i c (x) if he wins and 0 if he loses. This game has many equilibria, some of which involve players playing weakly-dominated strategies, and some of which rely on specific tie-breaking rules. Different equilibria lead to different payoffs. 40 Considering the limit of the equilibria of simple contests as α approaches 0, we obtain the following equilibrium of the game with α = 0. Players 1, . . . , m − 1 bid the threshold. Players m + 2, . . . , n bid 0. Players m and m + 1 bid as specified by the limit of the equilibria of two-player simple contests as α approaches 0. As shown in Section 3.1, this means that player m bids the threshold and player m + 1 bids according to the CDF
In particular, only player m+1 employs a mixed strategy. Players 1, . . . , m win a prize with certainty, and players' payoffs are given by Corollary 1. Thus, taking the fraction of the all-pay component to 0 can serve as a selection criterion that delivers a unique equilibrium of the limit game. This equilibrium is robust to the tie-breaking rule, and is "close" to the equilibria of "nearby" contests with a small all-pay component. A special case is the complete-information, pay-your-bid multiprize auction (γ i = 1 and c (x) = x).
Fully Unconditional Investments (α = 1)
When α = 1 the contest is separable and all investments are unconditional. We can then simplify (9) to obtain (11)
The following closed-form expression for s 
The special case of c (x) = x and γ i = 1 is the multiprize all-pay auction, which was first analyzed by Clark and Riis (1998) . Setting c (x) = x and γ i = 1 in (11) and (12) delivers the equilibrium described in their Proposition 1. 41 The analysis on page 279 of Clark and Riis (1998) applies to simple contests with α = 1, and provides a recursive closed-form formula for each player's expenditures and probability of winning, which are independent of c.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated equilibrium behavior in a single-prize and multiprize contest model featuring asymmetric contestants and a combination of unconditional and condi-41 Theorem 9 applied to multiprize all-pay auctions corrects two imprecisions in Clark and Riis (1998).
The first is that they claimed uniqueness of equilibrium but provided an incorrect proof of this claim, as discussed in footnote 6 above. The second is that their footnote 6 claims that multiple equilibria arise when two or more players have the same valuation. Theorem 9 shows that the equilibrium is unique even if several players have the same valuation for a prize, as long as the valuation of the marginal player is different from those of all other players.
tional investments. These features, which are common to many real-world competitions, are not well accommodated by existing models and may lead to complicated equilibrium behavior. In particular, the support of a player's equilibrium strategy may consist of several disjoint intervals. I have solved for the unique equilibrium in two-player, single-prize contests, and provided an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium for a large class of multiprize contests. What matters for equilibrium uniqueness in a contest for m prizes is that only the strongest m + 1 players participate, which is implied when weak players are everywhere disadvantaged relative to the marginal player. Many existing models of competition, including multiprize all-pay auctions, satisfy this condition.
The key to the equilibrium construction is a dynamic supply function, which uses players' equilibrium payoffs and semi-elasticities to determine how the set of active players changes at different scores. A similar function can be used to solve the matching model of Bulow and Levin (2006) . 42 An interesting question is whether similar functions can be used to solve other complete-information games with a continuum of pure strategies in which players compete for multiple prizes, such as wars of attrition.
As an application of the algorithm and the equilibrium uniqueness result, I have in- The effects of changing the number of prizes, the set of participants, the scoring rule, and other characteristics of a competition can also be studied using this framework. As discussed in Section 2.3, this can help us think about policy and design issues and enhance our understanding of real-world competitions. 
A Proofs of Results from Section 2 A.1 Proof of Lemma 4
The proof includes three lemmas.
Lemma 5
The algorithm can proceed from any switching point lower than T that has been reached.
Proof. There are two statements to prove. The first is that at every switching point lower than T , for every player i either (2) holds or (1) holds (which also implies that D from
Step 3 of the algorithm is in (0, 1] ). The second is that the set of candidate players at every switching point contains at least two players. I will show that these statements hold for every x ≤ T (not necessarily a switching point) that has been reached by the algorithm. It is easy to check that the statements hold at x = 0. Suppose that they hold at the switching pointx that precedes x, and denote byx the next switching point (so x ∈ [x,x]). Because G is extended fromx tox according to (8) (with G (T ) = 1), (2) holds for every i ∈ A + (x) and every x ∈ [x,x]. By Step 4 of the algorithm, (1) holds for every i / ∈ A + (x) and every x ∈ (x,x), and atx, for every i / ∈ A + (x) either (2) holds or (1) holds. Therefore, the first statement holds. For the second statement, if |CP (x)| ≥ 2 then by definition of the supply function |A
Semi-elasticities are not defined at T , because q i (T ) = 0 for every player i. Therefore, denote by e i (x) =
Lemma 6 For every player i, e i is well-defined and analytic in a neighborhood of T .
Proof. To show that e i is well defined it suffices to show that lim x→T ε i (x) (T − x) exists and is finite. By definition,
provided the latter limit exists. By analyticity of v i at T , for every x in some neighborhood of T we have
is the k th order derivative of v i . Therefore the right-hand side of (13) equals
where k i is as in Theorem 5. k i is well defined because if all the derivatives of an analytic function at a point are 0 the function is constant, but v i is strictly decreasing. Because ε i (x) (T − x) is analytic at any x in some punctured neighborhood of T , to show that e i is analytic in a neighborhood of T it suffices to show that for any x in some neighborhood of T , e i (x) = P ∞ k=0 a k (x − T ) k for some coefficients a 0 , a 1 , . . .. Such a power series can be derived for e i (x) by using Cauchy multiplication, because v i and c i are analytic in a neighborhood of T , v i (T ) + c i (T ) 6 = 0, and (14) shows that
is the quotient of two power series in which the first coefficient in the denominator is non-zero.
Lemma 7
The number of switching points in [0, T ] is finite.
Proof. The previous lemma shows that players' elasticities are analytic on [x, T ] for somẽ x < T . For simplicity suppose thatx = 0 (the proof extends in an obvious way to piecewise analyticity, and for anyx < T players' elasticities are piecewise-analytic on [0,x]). Denote by E the set of players' elasticities, and consider the set of functions H = {t B : B ⊆ N , |B| ≥ 2} , where t B (x) = 1 |B| − 1 X i∈B e i (x) .
Rank the functions in E ∪ H by their value at every score in [0, T ]. Because elasticities are analytic, so is every function in H. Therefore, [0, T ] can be divided into a finite number of intervals such that the ranking of the functions in E ∪ H is constant on each interval. Choose one such interval I. It suffices to show that the number of switching points in I is finite. Consider x < T in I at which all semi-elasticities are positive. 44 Because the ranking of the functions in E ∪ H is constant on I and e i (x) ≤ t A + (x) (x) if and only if ε i (x) ≤ P j∈A + (x) ε j (x) / (|A + (x)| − 1) = H (x), a player i ∈ A + (x) can become inactive at a score in I above x only if a player with a strictly lower semi-elasticity becomes active. An infinite number of switching points in I implies that some player becomes inactive and active an infinite number of times, which, by the above, implies that a player with a strictly lower semi-elasticity becomes inactive and active an infinite number of times, etc. This is impossible because the number of players is finite and the ranking of their semi-elasticities does not change in I\ {T }.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove that G is an equilibrium, it suffices to show three things: (i) G is a profile of CDFs (non-decreasing and right-continuous; G i (T ) = 1 by construction for every player i), (ii) no player can obtain a payoff higher than his power when the other players choose scores according to G, and (iii) every player i assigns G i -measure 1 to scores that give him a payoff equal to his power when the other players choose scores according to G. For (ii), the proof of Lemma 5 shows that for every x < T and every player i either (2) holds or (1) holds, so no player can obtain more than his power by choosing x < T . By definition of power, no player obtains more than his power if he chooses a score higher or equal to T even if he wins a prize with certainty. For (i), consider any two consecutive switching points x <x and any i ∈ A + (x). The hazard rate of G i at scores y immediately above x is, by construction, H (x, y) − ε i (y) ≥ 0. This shows that G is non-decreasing immediately above x. The switching pointx is chosen such that no player's hazard rate it negative at any score up tox. Therefore, G is non-decreasing on [x,x] / {T }. That G is continuous on (0, T ) and right-continuous at 0 and T follows from (8) . And (ii) and continuity of G on (0, T ) imply that G j (x) < 1 for every player j and x < T , so G is non-decreasing on [0, T ]. For (iii), by construction G i increases on (0, T ) only when (2) holds for player i, so scores in (0, T ) for which (2) does not hold have G i -measure 0. And by continuity of G on (0, T ), when (2) holds player i obtains his power. At 0 the marginal player obtains 0, and every player obtains his power when choosing T , because lim x→T G i (x) = 1 for at least two players: otherwise |CP (x)| < 2 for x < T sufficiently close to T , contradicting the proof of Lemma 5.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose player i / ∈ A + (x) for x immediately below the threshold. Then, because the number of switching points is finite, i / ∈ CP (x), i.e., f (x) = P j6 =i ln (1 − G j (x)) −ln q i (x) > 0, for all x immediately below the threshold. for all x sufficiently close to T . This inequality follows from lim x→T ε i (x) /ε j (x) = 1 and l'Hopital's rule.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
The proof requires the following definition.
Definition 3 An equilibrium is constructible if for every x < T there exists somex > x such that for each player either every score in (x,x) is a best response, or no score in (x,x) is a best response.
By construction, the output of the algorithm is a constructible equilibrium. Thus, an (m + 1)-player regular contest has a constructible equilibrium. I will show that the existence of a constructible equilibrium guarantees equilibrium uniqueness. Theorem 6 is an immediate corollary.
Theorem 11
If an (m + 1)-player contest, regular or not, has a constructible equilibrium, then that is the unique equilibrium of the contest.
For the proof, consider an (m + 1)-player contest with a constructible equilibrium G. Define CP (x) as the set of players for whom x is a best response in G (i.e., when G is played), and A + (x) as the set of players for whom all scores immediately above x are best responses in G. Define x ∈ [0, T ] to be a switching point if x ∈ {0, T }, or if x ∈ (0, T ) and every neighborhood of x contains a score y such that CP (y) 6 = CP (x). Because is G constructible, for every switching point x < T there is a unique next switching pointx > x such that CP (y) = A + (x) for every y ∈ (x,x). Choose any equilibrium e G of the contest. I will show that f CP (x) = CP (x) for every x ∈ (0, T ), where f CP (x) is set of players for whom x is a best response in e G. The following lemma shows that this proves Theorem 11.
Lemma 8 For anyx ∈ (0, T ], if f CP (x) = CP (x) for every x ∈ (0,x), then e G(x) = G (x) for every x ∈ [0,x].
Proof. Denote byx the infimum of the scores on which e G differs from G. Since e G(0) = G (0) (Lemma 3), G and e G are continuous on (0, T ) (part (1) of Lemma 2), and e G i (T ) = G i (T ) = 1 for every player i (part (3) of Lemma 2), we have e G(x) = G (x). Ifx <x, then because G is constructible and f CP (x) = CP (x) for every x ∈ [0,x), we have that immediately abovex both e G i and G i are given by (8) for every i ∈ A + (x) and equal G i (x) for every i / ∈ A + (x). This contradicts the definition ofx, sox ≥x.
Suppose in contradiction that f CP (y) 6 = CP (y) for some y ∈ (0, T ). Let x k < T be the highest switching point such that f CP (·) = CP (·) on [0,
because e
